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The subject matter of this paper is the design of appropriate Central Banking
arrangements and exchange rate regimes for those former centrally planned
Central and East European countries that are candidates for full membership
in the European Union. We give an overview of the existing arrangements and
point out to which extent monetary arrangements are restricted by conditions
for entry both into the European Union and eventually into the European
Monetary Union. Furthermore we investigate to which degree countries are
fulfilling the accession criteria and compare their performance with the
performance of earlier EU joiners like the countries of the Iberian Peninsula,
Ireland and Greece.
After concluding that the accession criteria do not necessarily favour a
particular monetary regime, we analyse the pros and cons of the two regimes
widely believed to be most stable: currency boards and inflation targeting. We
find that under either regime tensions are likely to arise from the attempt to
meet the accession criteria of a low inflation rate and a stable exchange rate.
Due to likely large productivity gains in the traded goods sector the real
exchange rate can be expected to display a trend appreciation. Thus a
currency board arrangement may well fail to produce an inflation rate below
the Maastricht ceiling, unless the economy is run with a wasteful amount of
spare capacity. Similarly the credibility of any inflation target would be
undermined by the requirement that the exchange rate be kept within a
specified target zone. This conflict could be resolved if the inflation ceiling
was re-specified in terms of traded goods price inflation (and preferable in
terms of ‘core’ traded goods price inflation) but this would require a change
in the Maastricht Treaty.Contents
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The subject matter of this paper is the design of appropriate Central Banking
arrangements and exchange rate regimes for those former centrally planned
Central and East European countries that are candidates for full membership
in the European Union. There are ten countries in the Group of ‘official’
candidate countries – the thirteen countries for whom the process that will
make EU enlargement possible was launched by the EU in March 1998:
1
Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland,
Romania, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia.
The original two-tier system had a first group containing the Czech Republic,
Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia which was expected to join the EU
first (henceforth Group 1), and a second group containing Bulgaria, Latvia,
Lithuania, Romania and the Slovak Republic (henceforth Group 2)
2.
Following the November 1999 Helsinki summit, the two-tier system was
abandoned and replaced by an informal ‘queue’. Individual candidates for
accession could advance or fall back, depending on their success in
implementing the ‘Acquis Communautaire’ and satisfying the other
conditions for entry. There is no longer any presumption that countries will
enter as a group. In addition, there are countries like Croatia, which currently
are not on the list of official EU accession candidates but which, on current
transition form, are quite likely to become full EU members before some of
the countries that are on that list like Romania which regressed during 2000
as regards the ‘Acquis’.
As regards likely accession dates, there is no longer any prospect of any of
the front runners joining on January 1, 2003, the date envisaged, or at any rate
aspired to, by some of them. It remains a possibility that the first accessions
take place in January 2004, but January 2005 seems a safer bet. Further delays
are certainly possible, as enlargement has effectively been made contingent
on the success of internal reforms in the EU. Key required institutional
reforms include such contentious issues as the scope of the national veto, the
rules (including the weighting of the national votes) governing qualified
7
1 The three other official candidates are Cyprus, Malta and Turkey.
2 Cyprus was the sixth member of this group.majority voting, and the size of the Commission. Critical substantive reforms
include the Reform of the Common Agricultural Policy. The EU’s
Intergovernmental Conference of December 2000 in Nice failed to reform EU
institutions to the point that they might be workable in a Union of up to 25
members. The next serious attempt to create workable EU institutions has
been put off till 2004.
The exact meaning of membership for the candidate accession countries is
becoming less clear. There are likely to be lengthy transition periods in such
areas as labour mobility and the environmental acquis. There have recently
been suggestions both that, as part of a multi-speed EU, different incumbent
members could treat any given new member differently, and that any given
incumbent member might accord different treatment to different new
members. As Berglof and Roland [2000] put it: “…, membership is becoming
more gradual and its meaning increasingly vague“.
EU membership does not imply immediate membership in the Economic and
Monetary Union (EMU). It is true that for the current crop of accession
candidates, any formal derogation from EMU membership, of the kind
obtained earlier by the UK and Denmark, will no longer be possible. The
obligation to join EMU, once the Maastricht criteria for membership are
satisfied, will be part of the ‘Acquis Communautaire’ that candidate EU
members will have to take on board.
However, whether and when the Maastricht criteria are satisfied will be to a
significant extent at the discretion of the candidate members. Sweden, for
instance, does not have an EMU derogation but has thus far evaded the
obligation to join EMU by choosing not to satisfy the exchange rate criterion
(successful membership in the Exchange Rate Arrangement (ERM) for a
period of at least two years).
The full set of macroeconomic Maastricht criteria for membership in EMU is
as follows. There is a pair of financial criteria, a ceiling on the general
government deficit-GDP ratio of 3% and a ceiling on the gross general
government debt-GDP ratio of 60%. There also is an interest rate criterion:
long-term (ten year) nominal interest rates on the public debt are to be within
2 percent of the average in the three countries with the best inflation record.
Next comes the inflation criterion: the annual inflation rate cannot exceed the
average of the three best performing countries by more than 1.5 percent.
Finally, there is the exchange rate criterion: EMU candidates will (almost
surely) have to join an ERM2 arrangement. Within the 15 percent bands, the
8 Introductionexchange rate will have to be stable (without using capital or exchange
controls etc.) for two years prior to joining EMU. There is also the
institutional requirement that the central bank be independent.
3
An important point to keep in mind is that, while the achievement of each
of the targets implied by the Maastricht criteria is more or less under the
control of the national monetary authority and the national government, the
whole set of targets together is not. For instance, the targets on (nominal)
interest rates and inflation put constraints on real interest rates; and the
target on nominal exchange rates and inflation put restrictions on real
exchange rates. Real interest rates cannot be controlled by the national
authority, especially not, if there is a high degree of international capital
mobility, although they may be able to influence national (default) risk
premia. The real exchange rate (the relative price of traded to non-traded
goods) is affected by fiscal policy and other structural measures, but also
depends on how quickly productivity in the traded and non-traded goods
sectors rises to Western European levels. Again this is something the
authorities can control only indirectly and imperfectly. Thus, the likelihood
and timing of entry will depend on the degree and speed of convergence
of the economies of the accession countries with those of the existing EU
members. The criteria don’t put very severe restrictions on the permissible
monetary regime prior to and immediately following accession. Floating
within a band or narrow target zone, active exchange rate management, a
conventional fixed exchange rate regime, a currency board and full,
unilateral euroisation are all consistent with the Maastricht criteria for
joining EMU.
4
Below we investigate the degree to which individual accession countries
currently satisfy what we consider to be the two key Maastricht criteria for
EMU membership – the inflation and the exchange rate criteria –, and how
Introduction 9
3 For more details, see Appendix.
4 There has been some argument as to whether unilateral adoption of the euro as the sole
currency and legal tender by a candidate EMU members is consistent with the criteria. The
argument is that, once the domestic currency has been abolished, there no longer is any way
for the Council of Ministers to determine the conversion rate at which the candidate EMU
member’s currency joins EMU. The candidate EMU member would effectively have been able
to determine its euro conversion rate unilaterally. Even if the candidate EMU member’s own
currency is not formally abolished and remained joined legal tender with the euro, the use of
the own currency as a means of payment, numéraire and store of value could be discouraged
in a variety of ways. The conversion rate ultimately decided by the Council could be irrelevant




5 The central bank independence criterion does not normally feature prominently in
discussions of EMU membership conditionality, but it may turn out to be a binding constraint
for at least one leading accession candidate, the Czech Republic, which is currently considering
a modification of its central bank statutes which appears likely to violate the Maastricht
Criteria. The Maastricht interest rate criterion will be quite difficult to satisfy for a number of
accession candidates, because the market for 10-year government debt is thin or non-existent
in quite a few of the accession countries.
6 We will not consider exchange rate regimes with more than one official exchange rate for
current account transactions. We can think of no circumstances under which efficiency,
stability or fairness are well-served by a multiple official exchange rate regime for current
account transactions. When the same commodity is traded at different prices, there will be
distortions, corruption and rent-seeking. Multiple official exchange rate regimes also tend to
cause quasi-fiscal deficits for the central bank.
7 The government debt and deficit criteria have been interpreted so flexibly for the 11 first-
round EMU members that joined on January 1, 1999, and for Greece, which become an EMU
member on January 1, 2001, that it is hard to conceive of them becoming a binding constraint
for future EMU candidates.II. Monetary and Exchange Rate Regimes in Accession
Countries: Current Practice
Before turning to the question as to what the exchange rate arrangements of
the accession candidates will be or ought to be, a quick glance at current
practices is in order. Table 1 (see next page) characterises the current
exchange rate regime of each of the 10 countries and contains a brief
description of the current account and capital account restrictions in effect.
8
Among the 10 Central and East European accession candidates, three have a
currency board (Bulgaria and Estonia with respect to the Euro, Lithuania with
respect to the US$), Latvia has a conventional fixed exchange rate regime
with a peg against the SDR, Hungary has a crawling peg against a Euro/US$
basket and the remaining five countries have a managed float. Managed
floats cover a wide spectrum of possibilities. There is no suggestion that a
managed float is necessarily well-managed. Among the five managed
floaters, the Czech Republic has an inflation target net of administered prices,
the Slovak Republic has a core inflation target, Poland has a headline
inflation target and Slovenia has an M3 growth target. The Romanian central
bank (NBR) has price stability as its primary mandate, but does not have an
inflation target.
In addition to having differing exchange rate regimes, the 10 accession
candidates differ somewhat in their approaches to the international mobility
of financial capital. Note, from Table 1, that all of them have adopted IMF
Article VIII, which proscribes control on current account transactions. All ten
countries have liberalised at least some types of capital account transactions.
No country has completely unrestricted mobility of financial capital, although
Estonia comes close. Poland has liberalised its controls on long-term capital
flows but retains some controls on short-term capital flows, direct investment
and real estate transactions.
Motivations for imposing capital controls differ among countries and
instruments. So does their effectiveness. Controls on short-term capital flows
are often motivated by the desire to avoid sudden large shifts in capital
11
8Article VIII of the IMF Articles of Agreement obliges members not to impose controls on












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1inflows or outflows, which could threaten exchange rate stability and/or
undermine the liquidity or solvency of domestic financial institutions.
Restrictions on the purchase of land or real estate by foreigners tend to be
motivated by non-economic considerations.
The „short term“ in „short-term capital flows“ refers to the remaining time to
maturity (or sometimes to the original maturity) of the financial instrument,
not to the expected holding period of the investor. If there are liquid
secondary markets for long-dated financial instruments, high frequency
reversals of capital flows do not require the presence of short-term
internationally traded securities. Even FDI is, in principle, easily reversed, if
there is a liquid and deep market for ownership claims (equity). Nor does the
absence of a large stock of foreign currency liabilities (of any maturity)
provide a reason for feeling relaxed about speculative attacks on the currency.
What matters here is the capacity or ability to short the domestic currency and
go long in foreign exchange in any of a wide range of spot, forward or
contingent claims markets.
More generally, the manner in which capital has, in the past, entered a country
need bear no relationship to the manner in which capital can, at some later
date, leave the country. Take, e.g. a country like Poland, which has recently
financed a current account deficit mainly through FDI, including privatisation
receipts (that is, the capital account showed net inflows of FDI of a magnitude
similar to the current account deficit). There is nothing to prevent such a
country from subsequently experiencing a speculative attack against the
domestic currency through large scale outflows of short-term or long-term
portfolio capital.
While the range of financial instruments that can be traded internationally
remains restricted, it is wide enough to expose each one of the 10 accession
countries to the threat of sudden, large reversals in capital flows.
Monetary and Exchange Rate Regimes in Accession Countries: Current Practice 13III. Monetary and Exchange Rate Regimes in Accession
Countries: the Optimal Currency Area Perspective
What is the appropriate exchange rate regime for each of the accession
candidates? In what follows we restrict the analysis to the comparison of two
exchange rate regimes: a currency board and a floating exchange rate regime
with inflation targeting. The experience of these past 20 years seems to
support the view that only the two extremes of the currency regime spectrum
are viable in a world with few restrictions on the international mobility of
capital (see e.g. Fischer [2001]). These two extremes are a credible fixed
exchange rate regime and a floating exchange rate. While we will concentrate
on these two extreme regimes, we will also, in Section IV, consider the case
for making the euro a parallel currency in accession candidates, that is,
making it legal tender in all domestic transactions, on the same terms as the
local currency.
A common currency or monetary union clearly represents the most credible
fixed exchange rate regime. We view monetary union with full membership
of EMU as the target regime for the accession countries once EU membership
has been achieved. Of course, monetary union with full EMU membership is
not an option prior to EU membership, although the unilateral adoption of the
EMU as the national currency is.
The next most credible fixed exchange rate regime is a currency board,
defined here as a fixed exchange rate regime without domestic credit
expansion by the central bank, that is, with 100% international reserve
backing of the monetary base. In the simplest case, foreign exchange
reserves are the only financial asset of the monetary authority, with the
monetary base the only financial liability. The peg could either involve a
single currency or a basket of currencies, as with Latvia’s peg to the SDR.
For simplicity we consider only a single currency peg vis-à-vis the euro.
The euro could, but need not, be legal tender in the country operating the
currency board.
Many variations on the pure currency board model have been implemented in
practice (see e.g. Ghosh, Gulde and Wolf [2000]). Most involve adding to the
asset and/or liability menu of the monetary authority. For instance, domestic
commercial banks could have contingent credit lines with the monetary
authority; the monetary authority could have contingent credit lines with
15foreign financial institutions, private or public and the monetary authority
could have limited authority to extend credit to the government and/or the
private sector. Each relaxation of the strict currency board model moves it
closer to the traditional central bank managing the oxymoron of a ‘fixed-but-
adjustable’ peg.
A floating exchange rate regime is compatible with a number of different
nominal anchors, including an index of prices or of inflation rates, or some
monetary aggregate. We focus on a regime of inflation targeting, mainly
because of its widespread adoption in recent years and the generally
favourable experiences under that regime. The definition of the appropriate
price index and the specification of the horizon over which the inflation target
is to be pursued will be reviewed below.
The following characteristics of an economy have been argued to make
nominal exchange rate flexibility desirable.
(1) A high degree of nominal rigidity in domestic prices and/or costs.
(2) A relatively large size and low degree of openness to trade in real goods
and services.
(3) A high incidence of asymmetric (nation-specific) shocks rather than
symmetric or common shocks and/or dissimilarities in national economic
structures or transmission mechanisms that cause even symmetric shocks
to have asymmetric consequences.
(4) A less diversified structure of production and demand.
(5) A low degree of real factor mobility (especially labour mobility) across
national boundaries.
(6) Absence of significant international (and supra-national) fiscal transfer
mechanisms.
Nominal cost and price rigidities
If there are no significant nominal cost and price rigidities, the exchange
rate regime is a matter of supreme macroeconomic insignificance. Note that
it is only nominal rigidities that matter. A country can be mired in real
rigidities (rigid real wages, inflexible relativities, high non-wage labour
costs, stagnating productivity, immobile factors of production) and its real
economic performance will be miserable, without this having any
implications for the choice of exchange rate regime. Unless these real
rigidities can be addressed effectively through nominal exchange rate
16 Monetary and Exchange Rate Regimes in Accession Countriesvariations, the country’s performance will be equally miserable with a
credible fixed exchange rate, with a floating exchange rate, or with a system
of universal bilateral barter.
The severity and persistence of nominal rigidities therefore becomes a key
empirical and policy issue. Unfortunately, the available empirical evidence is
extremely opaque and very hard to interpret. Even if information on the
duration of nominal wage and price contracts and on the extent to which they
are synchronised or staggered is available, its interpretation is obviously
subject to the Lucas critique. These contracting practices are not facts of
nature, but the outcomes of purposeful choices. Changes in the economic
environment conditioning these choices will change the practices.
Testing price and wage data for persistence is equally unlikely to be
enlightening. The pattern of serial correlation in the data reflects both ‘true’
structural lags, invariant under changes in the economic environment, and
expectational dynamics that will not be invariant when the rules of the game
are perceived to have changed. There is no deep theory of nominal rigidities
worth the name.
This leaves us in an uncomfortable position. We believe the numéraire
matters, although we cannot explain why (using conventional economic
tools). We believe that nominal wage and price rigidities are common and that
they matter for real economic performance, but we do not know how to
measure these rigidities, nor how stable they are likely to be under the kind of
policy regime changes that are under discussion.
Size, openness and direction of trade
The relevant metric for ‘size’ in economics is market power. A large country
has the ability to influence its external terms of trade (the relative price of
exports and imports) or the world prices of the financial securities it deals in
(the world rate of interest). From this perspective, even Poland, the largest of
the 10 accession countries is small.
A country that is small as regards trade in real goods and services (a price
taker in the world markets for imports and exports) cannot use variations in
its nominal exchange rate to affect its international terms of trade. Of course,
not all final and intermediate goods and services are internationally traded
and labour services are overwhelmingly non-traded. Nominal wage rigidities
are therefore sufficient to give the nominal exchange rate a (temporary)
Monetary and Exchange Rate Regimes in Accession Countries 17handle on the real economy, through its ability to influence relative unit
labour costs and profitability.
A common theme in most Optimal Currency Area approaches is that an
economy that is more open to trade in goods and services gains less from
nominal exchange rate flexibility (see e.g. Mundell [1961], Mc Kinnon
[1963]) . It should be obvious that this proposition cannot be correct as stated.
For an economy that is completely closed to trade in goods and services, the
exchange rate regime is irrelevant, from the point of view of macroeconomic
stabilisation. If there is a relationship between degree of openness and the cost
of giving up exchange rate flexibility, the relationship cannot be monotone.
Most of the countries in Eastern Europe are much more open to trade today
than the late joiners into the EU (Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain) were
when they joined. The evidence is contained in Table 2.
Table 2
Source: WDI data base
%o fG D P %o fG D P
Trade (% of GDP) (current prices) (PPP)
1986 1998 1986 1998
group of EU late joiners
Greece 44 40 15 19
Ireland 103 141 88 134
Portugal 63 72 22 44
Spain 38 56 18 37
group 1











Slovak Republic 139 46
average late EU joiner 62 77 36 59
average group 1 113 48
average group 2 101 32
18 Monetary and Exchange Rate Regimes in Accession CountriesWhile trade accounted for 62% of GDP on average among the EU late
comers, the ratio is almost twice as high for the accession countries of
Group 1 and hardly lower for the countries in Group 2. Comparing the two
largest economies in Group 1 with most recent EU members, Poland is much
more open than Spain was when it joined the EU. Even today Spain’s trade
does not account for a higher share of GDP than Poland’s trade. The picture
doesn’t change much if we value GDP at PPP rather than at current (market)
exchange rates. Poland’s trade today still accounts for a higher share of GDP
than did Spain’s when that country entered the European Union, but Spain’s
share of trade today is higher than that in Poland. The same is true for the
averages in the ratio of Group 1 and the EU late joiners. Furthermore if valued
at PPP exchange rates, the share of trade in GDP is higher for the late EU
comers when they joined than for the countries in Group 2.
As can be seen from Table 3 below, all accession countries are conducting a
large share of their trade with countries in Euroland.
Table 3
Source: Direction of Trade Statistics, IMF, June 2000
For the countries in Group 1, this share exceeds 50% and it rises to more than
70% if one includes all countries in the European Union and the countries in
Trade with EU+group1 Trade with EU Trade with EMU
% of total trade % of total trade % of total trade
group 1
Czech Republic 75 68 59
Estonia 62 60 39
Hungary 77 73 65
Poland 73 67 60
Slovenia 76 70 64







Slovak Republic 54 49
average 56 40
Monetary and Exchange Rate Regimes in Accession Countries 19Group 1. Thus, the likelihood of these countries being hit hard by an
asymmetric external shock instead of just external shock originating from a
country or region outside the EU, is rather small. Even during the turmoil of
the Russian and Asian crises, the countries of Group 1, with the exception of
Estonia, were not much more affected than the economies of Euroland (see
Transition Report 1999).
According to conventional OCA theory, this concentration of trade suggests
that the accession countries have a very natural anchor in form of the euro if
they chose to go for a currency board. Again, this argument does not appear
robust. Presumably a flexible exchange rate vis-à-vis one’s main trading
partner would be desirable if there were frequent significant real shocks that
require an adjustment of international prices, since, in the presence of
nominal cost or price rigidities, such an adjustment is more easily achieved
through an adjustment of the nominal exchange rate than through variations
in domestic and foreign nominal costs and prices at a given nominal exchange
rate.
Whatever the merits of the theoretical argument linking exchange rate
flexibility and openness, it is clear that by most measures the accession
countries are more open than Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain were when
they joined the European Union. Furthermore most of them conduct a very
high share of their trade with one currency block: Euroland.
Asymmetric shocks or transmission
The ‘one-size fits all’ monetary policy corset inflicted on the members of a
monetary union is most costly if a member state is subject to severe
asymmetric shocks or if its structure is such as to cause even symmetric or
common shocks to have seriously asymmetric impacts on output and
employment. The proposition that a fixed exchange rate is more attractive
when the structure of production and demand is well-diversified should be
seen as a statement about the conditions under which asymmetric shocks are
less likely.
Differences in the structure of production or in the composition of demand
may be suggestive of possible asymmetric shocks or asymmetric transmission
of common shocks. Table 4 below compares the shares of manufacturing
value added and of agricultural value added and employment of the Group 1
countries in 1997 with those of the EU late joiners in 1986.
20 Monetary and Exchange Rate Regimes in Accession CountriesTable 4: Sectoral structure of the economies
* male employment (% share of economically active population)
** data is for 1994
Source: WDI data base
While it would be preferable to look at the structure of GDP at a more
disaggregated level, at the one digit level the difference between the
economies of Group 1 and the current EU do not look any bigger than the
difference between the EU late joiners and the EU average (at the time they
joined). The two entries that stand out are Poland’s share of male agricultural
employment in total male employment during 1997, which was 21%, and
Poland’s share of agricultural value added in total value added in 1997, which
was 5%. These two figures imply that the gap between agricultural
productivity and economy-wide productivity is very large in Poland, and
larger than in the other Group 1 countries.
Identifying and measuring the shocks perturbing the accession countries in
the past is an exercise undertaken only by the brave. The further assumption
that the patterns revealed in the historical sample would remain valid in the
future, pre- and post-accession, is difficult to justify. We limit ourselves to a
very simple descriptive statistic. Table 5 below shows how inventory changes
in the Group 1 countries have been correlated during the period 1994–1998
with those in France and Germany since 1994.
manufacturing agriculture agriculture
% of value added % of value added male employment*
1986 1995 1986 1997 1990 1997
Average EU 85 22 4 2.4** 5.6 4.5
Average EU late joiners 23 18 9 6.1** 17.4 14
Greece 15 10 13 11.2** 20.5 18
Ireland 9 6.3** 20.7 15
Spain 26 18 7 3.0** 12.6 10
Portugal 29 25 6 4.0** 15.6 12
Average EU 95 19 3.7** 8
Average group 1 23 5 13
Czech Republic 4 7
Estonia 18 7
Hungary 24 6 11
Poland 21 5 21
Slovenia 29 4 12
Monetary and Exchange Rate Regimes in Accession Countries 21Table 5: The correlation in annual change of inventories across countries
(1994–1998)
Source: WDI data base
Statistically, business cycle fluctuations can be ‘accounted for’ by the
inventory cycle. Surprising in Table 5 is the small negative correlation
between the Netherlands and Germany, despite the Netherlands being
effectively on a DM standard during all of the period. This suggests that there
either were few common shocks or that the Dutch economy’s response to
these shocks, whether through the automatic servomechanisms of the market
or through policy, neutralised most of the common shocks. Table 5 also
suggests a weaker positive correlation between the German inventory cycle
and the inventory cycles of Group 1 than between that of Germany and the
other EU countries.
The correlation between, on the one hand, the central bank interest rate set in
Frankfurt and, on the other hand, the central bank interest rates in Hungary,
Correlation Correlation















United Kingdom 0.92 –0.46
average 0.46 0.01






22 Monetary and Exchange Rate Regimes in Accession Countriesthe Czech Republic, Estonia and Poland between January 1998 and
September 2000 is shown in Table 6. It is consistent with the view that over
the period in question, only Polish monetary policy followed the lead of first
the Bundesbank and then the ECB fairly closely.
Table 6: Correlation of central bank interest rates
(January 1998–September 2000)
Source: Bloomberg
There are two considerations that qualify the proposition that asymmetric
shocks make the retention of nominal exchange rate flexibility desirable.
Nominal exchange rate changes are the appropriate response only to
asymmetric shocks to the markets for goods and services, that is, to IS shocks
and aggregate supply shocks. In response to asymmetric monetary shocks
(LM shocks), a constant nominal interest rate is appropriate. In a world with
perfect international financial capital mobility, a constant nominal interest
rate translates into a constant expected rate of exchange rate depreciation. A
credible fixed exchange rate is the simplest way of delivering this optimal
response to LM shocks.
9
Second, it is important not to be excessively impressed with the efficiency of
financial markets in general, and with the efficiency of the foreign exchange
market in particular. The foreign exchange market and the exchange rate can
be a source of extraneous shocks as well as a mechanism for adjusting to
fundamental shocks. One cannot have the one without the other. The potential
advantages of nominal exchange rate flexibility as an effective adjustment
mechanism or shock absorber are bundled with the undoubted disadvantages
of excessive noise and unwarranted movements in the exchange rate,
inflicting unnecessary real adjustments on the rest of the economy.
Limited real resource mobility
It is clear that a high degree of real factor mobility can be an effective
substitute for nominal exchange rate adjustments in the face of asymmetric
Hungary Czech Rep. Estonia Poland UK
Euro /Germany –0.879991526 –0.457544 –0.0566075 0.872335 0.852456
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9 This is a straightforward extension of Poole [1970] to an open economy setting with
integrated global financial markets (see Buiter [1997]).shocks. Indeed, factor mobility permits long-term, even permanent, real
adjustments to asymmetric real shocks, something nominal exchange
flexibility cannot deliver. The real factors whose mobility matters are labour
and real or physical capital.
Real capital mobility, both within and between nations, is imperfect or
limited, even when financial capital mobility is perfect. Once real capital
(plant, machinery and other equipment, infrastructure etc.) is installed, it
becomes costly to shift geographically. There are some examples of ‘flying
capital’, such as Jumbo jets, that move very easily and at a low cost, and there
have been examples of whole factories being shipped over great distances by
rail or by ship. The conventional view in the OCA literature is that, as a first
approximation, real capital cannot be relocated. New gross investment can of
course be redirected across national boundaries, and financial capital mobility
can facilitate this process, by permitting the decoupling of national saving and
gross domestic capital formation. This is not a process that is likely to be very
significant at cyclical frequencies, however.
The technological developments of the past few decades may make the
argument that physical capital, once installed, is very costly to move
geographically, progressively less applicable. While a blast furnace is likely
to be prohibitively expensive to move geographically, many modern assembly
lines for high-tech products are extremely valuable in relation to their weight,
bulk, fragility and general unwieldy nature – the proximate determinants of
the cost of moving them geographically. They can be, and are, moved over
large distances in response to changes in relative costs of production (or to
changes in the other determinants of profitability).
There remain many obstacles to labour mobility between the accession
countries and the current EU and EMU members. Many obstacles are
cultural, including linguistic, or legal and administrative. While throughout
the existing EU, work permits are a thing of the past, and mutual recognition
of professional qualifications is becoming the norm rather than the exception,
cross-border mobility among EU members continues to be limited.
Whatever the cultural, administrative or legal obstacles to labour mobility
between the accession countries and the current EU members (in the years
prior to accession and in the years following accession), the net migration
flows between any two regions or countries are bound to be larger the larger
the difference between their real wages or real per capita income levels.
Table 7 contains some useful information in that regard.
24 Monetary and Exchange Rate Regimes in Accession CountriesTable 7 GNP compared to Euroland both in current $ and in PPP
Source: WDI data base
It shows that, at current market exchange rates, 1998 real per capita income
in Group 1 (with the exception of Slovenia) relative to the Euroland average,
is half or less what the EU late joiners had relative to the EC average in 1986.
This suggests that migration flows from the accession countries to the
existing EU members would be significantly larger than those experienced in
the late eighties and nineties between the EU late joiners and the earlier
members of the EC, especially if the interim or transitional arrangements
agreed between the accession countries and the EU significantly relax the
current legal and administrative obstacles to migration.
However, Table 7 also shows that at PPPexchange rates, these differences are
much smaller. This reflects the fact, discussed at greater length below, that
GNP p.c. as percentage
of EU averages
market prices PPP
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Greece 39 48 62 68
Ireland 55 73 48 76
Portugal 27 42 49 62
Spain 49 55 62 68
average 42 54 55 69
Monetary and Exchange Rate Regimes in Accession Countries 25GDP comparisons at current exchange rates yield significantly lower relative
GDP levels for transition economies than GDP comparisons at PPP exchange
rates. This in turn reflects the fact that the relative price of non-traded goods
in terms of traded goods is significantly higher in the advanced industrial
countries than in transition economies, including the accession countries.
Supranational fiscal stabilisation
Is a supranational budgetary authority with serious redistributive powers,
spanning the existing EMU members and the accession countries necessary to
make up for the loss of the exchange rate instrument the accession countries
were to adopt a currency board vis-à-vis the euro, or, in due course, were to
join EMU? The brief technical answer is ‘no’. Fiscal stabilisation policy
works if and to the extent that postponing taxes, and borrowing to finance the
resulting revenue shortfall, boosts aggregate demand. This will be the case
either if there is myopia among consumers, who fail to realise that the present
value of current and future taxes need not be affected by the timing of taxes,
or if postponing taxes redistributes resources between households with
different propensities to consume.
Unless the supranational federal fiscal authority in a currency union has
access to the financial markets on terms that are superior to those enjoyed by
the national fiscal authorities, there is nothing the federal authorities can
achieve by way of fiscal stabilisation that cannot be achieved equally well by
national or even lower-tier fiscal authorities. National government financial
deficits and surpluses, probably mirrored to some extent in national current
account imbalances, are a perfect substitute for supranational fiscal
stabilisation.
A study by Bayoumi and Masson [1994], building on earlier work by Sachs
and Sala-i-Martin [1992], analyses regional flows of federal taxes and
transfers within the USA and Canada. They try to distinguish between
long-term fiscal flows (the redistributive element) and short-term responses to
regional business cycles, which they identify with the stabilisation element.
They find that in the USA, long-run flows amount to 22 cents in the dollar
while the stabilisation element is 31 cents in the dollar. For Canada, the
corresponding figures are 39 cents and 17 cents respectively. While
interesting, these studies tell us nothing of relevance to the issue of whether
fiscal policy could compensate for the loss of the exchange rate instrument if
an accession country were to give up monetary autonomy. The long-term
redistribution properties of the budget are irrelevant, because the nominal
26 Monetary and Exchange Rate Regimes in Accession Countriesexchange rate is not an instrument for long-term redistribution. The
stabilisation properties of the fiscal system do matter, but the necessary
stabilisation can be provided at the supranational, national or sub-national
level.
To the extent that monetary union is part of a wider process of political
integration, political pressures may grow for long-term redistribution among
the nations that constitute the monetary union. What the redistribution figures
in the studies of Bayoumi and Masson and of Sachs and Sala-i-Martin tell us,
is the degree to which the United States and Canada are societies, rather than
just economies, and the extent to which notions of national solidarity and
regional social cohesion are translated into redistributive measures through
the tax-transfer mechanism.
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Which one dominates?
Currency boards
A currency board is probably the most credible fixed exchange rate regime,
although anything that has been made politically can also be unmade
politically. A pure currency board has the two key features pointed out in
section II: an irrevocably fixed exchange rate and the prohibition of domestic
credit expansion by the central bank. The entire monetary base is backed by
international reserves. There are several advantages, all of which depend on
the currency board arrangement being perceived as credible and permanent.
The first advantage is that the real resource cost of a currency board is less
than that of a full fledged, traditional monetary authority. Of course, banking
supervision and regulation are still required, but these activities need not be
undertaken by the monetary authority.
The second ‘advantage’is that a nation adopting a pure currency board throws
away the key to the drawer labelled ‘monetary financing of government
budget deficits’. In a well-run economy, with a benevolent, competent and
credible policy maker, this would actually be a drawback (see Calvo et al.
[1992]). Seigniorage can be a useful source of revenue for cash-strapped
governments. There is no reason to believe that the inflation rate generated
under a currency board is anywhere near the optimal rate from a neoclassical
public finance point of view.
However, political economy considerations, distilled from the often brutal
lessons of history, suggest that the printing press is a great seducer, and that
the freedom to issue monetary liabilities at will is likely to be abused. Of
course, responsible domestic credit expansion by the monetary authority is
not achievable only through the medium of a currency board.
10 Any
independent central bank (whether instinctively conservative and with both
operational and target independence, or with just operational independence,
but dedicated to an externally imposed mandate of price stability), could, in
principle, prevent the abuse of the printing presses. This, however, begs a
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10 If such were the case, the world as a whole would not be able to implement responsible
domestic credit expansion policies.number of key questions. Can the political realities support an operationally
and target-independent central bank? Would price stability be the overriding
target of a target-independent central bank? How would an operationally
central bank internalise an externally imposed price stability mandate? And
who would impose such a mandate on the central bank?
In many transition countries, the central bank is not even nominally
independent. Where it is nominally independent, it is often not effectively
independent. This problem is compounded by the fact that the central bank in
a number of transition economies does not limit itself to conventional central
banking roles (monetary policy and supervision and regulation of the banking
and financial systems), but also acts as a development bank and performs
commercial roles.
Among the traditional functions of a central bank is that of a lender of last
resort, to avoid liquidity crunches, including bank runs in times of financial
crisis. Under such circumstances the central bank should lend freely, against
the best available collateral, and at punitive rates. If a liquidity crisis becomes
a solvency crisis, the central bank does not have the resources to act
effectively. Only the state, through the Treasury and its power to tax, has the
resources to recapitalise insolvent financial institutions.
One obvious drawback of a currency board is that there can be no lender of
last resort, since domestic credit expansion by the monetary authority is ruled
out (see Chang et al. [1998], della Paolera et al. [1999]). There may be ways
of partially privatising the lender of last resort function by arranging
contingent credit lines, but the scope for that is inevitably limited.
A currency board makes the most sense for small, highly open countries. If a
country opts for a currency board, it should peg to a currency or to a basket
of currencies that accounts for the lion’s share of its external trade. For all
accession countries, the euro (or a currency basket with a dominant euro
share), will be the natural choice. Pegging to the US dollar or even to the
SDR, is an open invitation for trouble.
The experience with existing currency boards
As mentioned earlier, it has often been argued that currency boards (like all
(credible) fixed exchange rate regimes) involve a significant cost in terms of
foregone real growth in the long run, because the central bank is not able to
stabilise output after asymmetric shocks. A recent paper by Ghosh et al.
30 Currency Board or Floating-cum-Inflation Targeting: which one dominates?[2000] discredits this claim to some extent by investigating systematically the
growth performance of countries that have operated currency boards. When
controlling for the usual factors thought to determine growth, they actually
find, instead of a lower growth performance, a higher growth performance.
The obvious criticism to this sort of approach is that there might be what
econometricians call a selection bias in the sample on which the study is
based. Countries that introduce currency boards might very well have „good“
governments, while the quality of governments across the rest might be much
more mixed.
Across transition countries, there is also very little evidence so far that
currency stability in countries with currency boards has been bought at the
cost of real output stability or growth. Even though Bulgaria and some of the
Baltics have struggled following the Russian and Kosovo crises, it could be
argued that the non-currency board counterfactual could have been even
worse.
Inflation targeting
Inflation targeting has been ‘en vogue’ in most industrialised countries for
quite some time. Although the US Fed is not quite doing it formally, its actual
operating procedures under Volcker and Greenspan mimic inflation targeting.
The Bank of England has been doing it since 1992 and the ECB since 1999
(albeit without admitting to it). New Zealand, Australia and Canada also use
inflation targeting. So, why not the accession candidates?
Although there are quite a few differences among the above-mentioned
monetary authorities in how inflation targeting is actually designed and
implemented, there is a common core of key requirements for effective
inflation targeting found in all three. This goes well beyond the government
announcing some short term inflation target. This common core consists of
the following:
1. the public announcement of a numerical medium-term target for inflation
for a clearly defined basket of goods and services,
11 / 12
2. an institutional commitment to price stability as the primary goal of
monetary policy, to which other goals are subordinated,
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11 This can be a point target, a range or a ceiling.
12 The US Fed does not announce a numerical inflation target. Its official targets are
maximum employment, price stability and interest rate stability.3. a credible toolbox for linking monetary instruments to medium term
inflation outcomes, that makes use of all the information available,
4. transparency of the monetary policy strategy through communication with
the public.
Inflation targeting is said to have the key advantage that a country can keep
control over its monetary policy, which is in principle desirable in the
presence of asymmetric shocks. Nevertheless, in many countries it has
proven quite difficult to exploit this advantage. Monetary independence
permits flexibility (the valuable ability to respond to shocks), but the
downside of flexibility is opportunism, that is, discretion in the negative
sense of lack of credible precommitment. Independence associated with
opportunistic discretion has been discredited by the inflationary experience
of the 70’s, and ‘rules based’monetary policy, that is, monetary policy based
on credible precommitment, is the height of fashion among main stream
economists. Of course, rules can, in principle, be flexible, contingent rules
that permit a response to news. Unfortunately, it turns out to be rather
complicated to write down the optimal rule (flexible, but with commitment).
Thus, for example, in the case of New Zealand, one of the front runners in
rules-based monetary policy, there is now a wide-spread sense that the central
bank did not have enough positive discretion, that is, flexibility, in the wake
of the Asian Crisis.
Furthermore, the benefits of monetary independence in most accession
countries should not be overstated. Monetary policy is unlikely to be very
effective in stabilising output because credit, deposit and debt markets are still
rather underdeveloped. Furthermore, especially in the less advanced
countries, a substantial share of credits and deposits continues to be in foreign
currency. Thus, changes in the cost and availability of domestic credit are
unlikely to have a large immediate effect on output, either through the interest
rate or through the credit channel.
Accepting inflation as the overriding goal of monetary policy and giving up
the goal of stabilising the exchange rate can have important repercussions for
the banking system. Especially in the less advanced countries of the region,
large parts of the balance sheets of banks are still in dollars and other hard
currencies. Even if the balance sheet of the bank itself is balanced as regards
its foreign currency liabilities and assets, this need not be adequate insurance
against loss in case of large fluctuations in the exchange rate. A large
depreciation may lead to defaults by parties that have borrowed from the bank
in hard currency without matching the currency denominations of their own
32 Currency Board or Floating-cum-Inflation Targeting: which one dominates?debits and credits. Such borrower defaults can have a knock on effect on the
banking system.
A further important requirement for inflation targeting is the institutional
commitment of the central bank to the aim of price stability. This involves the
insulation of the policymaking board of the central bank from the partisan
political process. Members of the policy-making board of the central bank should
not have close ties to political parties or factions. They should be appointed for
a single term of office, which should be longer than the political cycle.
Much of the success of the inflation targeting central banks depends on hard-
gained reputation. Both the Bundesbank for much of its existence and the
current chairman of the Fed had or have an almost god-like status in the
public eye. Thus, they were or are very well insulated from short term
political pressures. No government or even academic in Germany blamed
slowdowns in the economy on the Bundesbank.
While reputations take time to establish, the experience of the Bank of
England has shown that it is possible to gain the trust of the financial markets
without having to painstakingly build a reputation over a long period of time.
A crucial element in gaining a reputation quickly is transparency and active
engagement in explaining policy decisions to the public. The Bank of
England, which gained operational independence only in June 1997, reaches
out even further by publishing within a fortnight of its monthly rate-setting
meetings, the minutes of these meetings and the votes of the individual
members of its policy-making Monetary Policy Committee. It also publishes
its quarterly Inflation Report, summarising its view on the performance of
past and future monetary policy and the prospects for inflation. Some authors
go as far as arguing that the communication of its strategy to the public has
been central to the success of inflation targeting in industrialised countries in
recent years. In the same vein, the less than wholly satisfactory performance
of the ECB since January 1999 has been attributed by some to its lack of
openness, transparency and accountability, both as regards its objectives and
as regards its operating procedures.
The optimal inflation target
Over the recent years a lot of research has gone into the question of what
constituted the optimal inflation target. This involves the composition of the
target basket, the horizon over which the target is to be pursued and the
numerical value assigned to the target. Currently the Czech central bank
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of tax changes)
13 for up to 30 months ahead. The Polish Central bank instead
targets headline inflation for at most 18 months ahead.
The consensus for very open economies appears to be that ideally the central
bank should target a medium term inflation target that filters out temporary
variations in the inflation rate, such as those due to transitory exchange rate
movements. The advantage of this approach over simple consumer price
basket targeting are higher the more open the economy is and the more volatile
the exchange rate. Paying attention to these issues is the more important the
larger and more volatile capital flows are. Especially when domestic financial
markets and the foreign exchange market lack depth and breadth, capital flows
can easily have large transitory effects on the exchange rate.
The challenges posed by international financial integration will continue to be
important for the accession countries, and on balance, its effects are likely to
be beneficial, provided effective regulation and supervision of domestic
financial institutions and markets can be established. With rapidly ageing
populations, domestic saving rates are unlikely to be sufficient to finance the
capital stock replacement and expansion necessary to catch up with the EU
(see Transition Report 2000). FDI inflows are key to the international transfer
of technology and know-how. International portfolio diversification offers
insurance possibilities that are not available domestically.
The downside of international financial integration is that the international
financial market system can be a source of volatility, shocks and instability.
Exchange rate volatility is reflected in import price volatility and temporary
variations in the rate of inflation. This effect is stronger the more open the
economy is to trade in goods and services. Undue sensitivity of domestic
monetary policy to such short-term movements in the inflation rate can be
destabilising for the real economy. Skilful monetary targeting filters out the
noise in the observed price, exchange rate and inflation signals and extracts
signal concerning the underlying inflation rate. It is sometimes argued that if
highly open transition economies target inflation, they should target
‘domestically generated inflation’. Unfortunately, there is no conceptually
clean way of separating imported and domestically generated inflation.
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13 Note that this is easier said than done. Simply stripping administered prices out of the
price index is likely to be a nonsense. The behaviour of the non-administered price component
is most unlikely to be independent of the behaviour of the administered prices. For instance,
freezing administered prices in an inflationary environment is likely to increase the inflation
rate of the non-administered prices.V. Balassa-Samuelson meets the EMU Inflation and
Exchange Rate Criteria
There may be a conflict between a key structural feature of the accession
countries and the inflation and exchange rate criteria for EMU membership.
We will show that, unless the inflation criterion is relaxed or reinterpreted for
accession countries adopting a currency board (or any other credible fixed
exchange rate regime), EMU may only be achievable at the expense of an
unnecessary recession in the accession countries.
Likewise, for those candidate EMU members that adopt a floating exchange
rate, it is likely to be necessary for the exchange rate stability criterion to be
interpreted asymmetrically if the inflation criterion is to be satisfied. That is,
unlike significant exchange rate depreciations, significant exchange rate
appreciations should be permitted during the two year ‘probationary period.
Together, the exchange rate criterion and the inflation criterion restrict the
scope for changes in the real exchange rate of the accession candidate
vis-à-vis Euroland. To have, say, a real appreciation requires either a nominal
appreciation (holding accession country and Euroland inflation rates
constant), or a higher domestic rate of inflation relative to Euroland (holding
the nominal exchange rate constant).
Real exchange rates of transition economies are volatile and subject to large
medium-term swings. There can be little doubt, however, that for most
accession countries, there must be the expectation, as part of the process of
transition and catch-up, of a significant trend appreciation of the real
exchange rate. The reason for this belief is the Balassa-Samuelson effect (see
Balassa [1964], Samuelson [1964, 1994], Heston, Nuxoll and Summers
[1994]).
Let  denote the inflation rate of traded goods prices in the accession
country, the inflation rate of traded goods prices in Euroland and ε the
proportional rate of depreciation of the accession country’s currency vis-à-vis
the Euro. Assume that the law of one price holds for traded goods, that is, the
forces of international trade arbitrage equalise the prices of traded goods and







The inflation rate relevant for the inflation criterion for EMU membership is
the inflation rate of a broad-based consumer price index, which includes both
traded and non-traded goods. Let  and  be the CPI inflation rate,
respectively the non-traded goods inflation rate, in the accession country and
and  the CPI inflation rate, respectively the non-traded goods inflation
rate, in Euroland. The share of non-traded goods in the consumption bundle
is α both in the accession country and in Euroland. It follows that
(1.2)
The price of (non-)traded goods is a mark-up on unit labour costs. Assume the
growth rate of wages within a country is the same for both sectors and that the
proportional mark-up on unit labour costs is constant. The growth rate of
money wages in country i is w
i and the sectoral productivity growth rates are
denoted and  ,  i=A ,E . It follows that
(1.3)
Thus, under reasonable assumptions, the difference between the CPI rates of
inflation in an accession country and Euroland equals the proportional rate of
deprecation of the nominal exchange rate plus the (common) share of nontraded
goods in the consumption basket, multiplied by the excess of the productivity
growth differential between the traded and non-traded goods sectors in the
accession country over that same sectoral productivity growth differential in
Euroland. It seems likely that the differential between productivity growth in
the traded goods sector and productivity growth in the non-traded goods sector
is larger in the candidate accession country than in Euroland, because
productivity catch-up is likely to be faster in the traded goods sector than in the
sheltered sector. This means that the relative price of non-traded goods to traded
goods will be rising faster in the accession candidate than in Euroland. This in
turn implies that, at a given exchange rate, the overall inflation rate will be
higher in the accession candidate than in Euroland.
Table 7 is consistent with this presentation. It shows, first, that there is a
sizeable gap in real per capita income, and therefore also in aggregate labour
productivity, between the accession countries and the existing Euroland





























36 Balassa-Samuelson meets the EMU Inflation and Exchange Rate Criteriamembers. Aggregate productivity catch-up is therefore possible and, in our
view, likely. Second, the real per capita GDP gap is much larger at market
exchange rates than at PPP exchange rates. Group 1 average real per capita
income is 21% of the Euroland level at market exchange rates and 48% at PPP
exchange rates. This reflects the fact that the relative price of non-traded
goods to traded goods is much lower in the accession countries than in
Euroland, reflecting a larger differential between the traded sector
productivity levels of Euroland and the accession countries than between the
non-traded sector productivity levels. If there is gradual catch-up between the
accession countries and Euroland on a sector-by-sector bases, the relative
price of non-traded goods will rise in the accession countries, since their
productivity growth differential between the traded goods sector and the non-
traded sectors can be expected to be larger than the corresponding Euroland
productivity growth differential.
If, at full capacity utilisation and a fixed exchange rate, the inflation
differential were to exceed the 1.5 percent permitted by the Maastricht
inflation criterion, the only way the candidate EMU member could meet the
inflation criterion at a fixed exchange rate would be to have a transitional
recession to depress the inflation rate for at least one year to the level required
by the Maastricht treaty. Following EMU membership however, the inflation
rate in the former accession country would continue to exceed that of the
older EMU members by the margin implied by the Balassa-Samuelson effect,
for as long as these intersectoral productivity growth differentials have not
converged.
A more elegant solution, permitting the EMU candidate to maintain a fixed
exchange rate without incurring an unnecessary recession would be to
redefine the inflation criterion of the Maastricht treaty in terms of the inflation
rate of traded goods only.
Establishing a currency board when the domestic rate of inflation is well in
excess of what can be rationalised with reference to the Balassa-Samuelson
effect would lead to a period of declining price and cost competitiveness
because of inertia or stickiness in the domestic wage-price process. Bringing
down inflation to the level warranted, at a fixed exchange rate, by the Balassa-
Samuelson effect and recouping the initial loss of competitiveness would
require a period of excess capacity. Inflation rates still differ markedly among
the accession countries, as is evident from Table 8.
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Source: WDI data base; ECB Monthly Bulletins
In Group 1, the lowest inflation rate in 1999 was achieved by the Czech
Republic, with 2.1%. Hungary had the highest inflation rate with 10.1%,
followed by Poland with 7.3%. Poland’s inflation rate for 2000 is likely to
come out at around 10%, as is Hungary’s.
Note that even if a candidate EMU member subject to the Balassa-Samuelson
effect were to float its exchange rate there might be problems in satisfying the
Maastricht criteria. Consider the case where monetary policy in the accession
country were to keep inflation at a level no more than 1.5% above the
Euroland level, but the inflation differential warranted by the Balassa-
Samuelson effect is greater than 1.5% at a given exchange rate and at full
capacity. The equilibrium response of the exchange rate would be an
appreciation. This could cause the accession country to fall foul of the
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38 Balassa-Samuelson meets the EMU Inflation and Exchange Rate CriteriaSamuelson effect is unlikely to exhaust the 15% bands of the ERM in two
years, assuming the exchange rate starts off in the middle of the band, but the
treaties are unclear as to whether merely staying within the 15% bands is
sufficient for satisfying the exchange rate criterion for EMU membership.
One way out of this problem would be to interpret the exchange rate criterion
asymmetrically, that is, to accept revaluations but not devaluations.
14
Until the transition candidate has evolved, structurally, to the point that there
no longer is any need for a steady appreciation of its real exchange rate, it
may be difficult to meet both the inflation and the exchange rate criteria for
EMU membership. Two ways out of this dilemma are (1) to re-interpret the
inflation criterion to apply only to the inflation rate of traded goods and (2) to
interpret the exchange rate stability criterion asymmetrically, permitting
nominal exchange rate appreciation during the two year period preceding
EMU membership.
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14 The Treaty does indeed not explicitly rule out revaluations or appreciations of the
exchange rate. Only devaluation is explicitly considered inconsistent with EMU membership.VI. The Euro as Parallel Currency for Accession Countries
One way for an accession country to give visible expression to its desire for
eventual EMU membership, is to make the euro a parallel currency for the
country in question. The euro would be declared legal tender for all
transactions under the accession country’s jurisdiction, on the same terms as
the local currency. Residents would be able to operate checkable euro
accounts with local financial institutions. The introduction of the euro as a
parallel currency, that is, as a competing currency with legal tender status
circulating alongside the fully convertible local currency would provide
additional monetary discipline. Local narrow money and the euro would
become closer direct substitutes. By making the euro a better direct substitute
for the local currency, any attempt at inflationary financing would be reigned
in by a shift in money demand away from the local currency and towards the
euro. In the limit, any non-zero anticipated depreciation of the local currency
against the euro would drive the demand for the local currency to zero;
likewise, any non-zero anticipated appreciation of the local currency against
the euro would reduce the local demand for euros for domestic transaction
purposes down to zero – a pure Kareken and Wallace world (Kareken and
Wallace [1981]).
15 Even under less idealized circumstances, the sensitivity of
the demand for local base money to expected depreciation/appreciation of the
exchange rate would be certain to increase if the euro were made legal tender.
A variety of monetary and exchange rate regimes are consistent with such
enhanced direct currency competition. At one extreme are the unilateral
adoption of the euro as the only legal tender, and the abolition of the domestic
currency. Acurrency board is consistent with the euro as parallel currency, but
so are managed and floating exchange rate regimes. Of course, if the euro and
the local currency were to become perfect direct substitutes, even a floating
exchange rate regime would turn out to support only constant exchange rate
equilibria. Any expected depreciation or appreciation would imply the total
abandonment of the currency that is expected to weaken.
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15 Narrow or base money is assumed to be non-interest bearing. The Kareken and Wallace
universe has the further interesting property that the level of the (expected) equilibrium
exchange rate, while constant, is indeterminate. Nominal price and/or wage rigidities would
eliminate this indeterminacy, but not the requirement that the expected equilibrium exchange
rate be constant.There is some historical experience with parallel currencies, and with the
behaviour of the inflation rates for the two currencies and the exchange rate
between them. A parallel or bi-currency standard has been used successfully
as a transitional mechanism to achieve monetary stability by Brazil in 1994
under the so-called „Real Plan“. Brazil adopted a new currency, the real,
pegged and fully backed by the US $. This real circulated alongside the old
currency, the cruceiro, which was Brazilian fiat money unbacked by US
dollars. After a few months, economic agents shifted, of their own volition,
towards using the new currency for invoicing and contracting. They also
increasingly abandoned the old currency as a transactions medium. The result
was a speedy reduction in the real value of the old currency and its de facto
(and later also de jure) abolition. Later on, of course, the link of the real and
the US dollar was abandoned, and the real turned out to be a nominal after all.
Parallel currencies have a much longer history, however, and can be found in
eastern Europe during extraordinary times. In 1921, the Soviet government,
as part of the so-called New Economic Policy, created a new currency, the
chervonets, backed by gold. For two years, this currency circulated alongside
the rouble (the called sovznak). Prices stabilised in the new currency
immediately, but inflation and devaluation continued in the old currency
along with monetary deficit financing (using the old currency). When the
budget was balanced in 1924, the old currency had been effectively
repudiated through hyperinflation and all contracts had become denominated
in chervonets at stable prices (Cagan [1956], Rostowski and Shapiro [1992],
Fischer [1994]). One can view this as a real-time approximation to a Kareken-
Wallace equilibrium.
42VII. Conclusion: Is Inflation Targeting a Better Option for
Accession Countries Than a Currency Board?
The criteria for accession to Economic and Monetary Union in their current
form include a ceiling for the permissible rate of inflation one year prior to
accession, in the price of a basket of consumer goods defined by Eurostat. An
exchange rate stability objective or constraint is also imposed for a 2-year
period prior to accession. The normal (presumably 15%) fluctuation margins
must be satisfied and there can be no devaluations.
It is clear that these criteria do not provide a perfect fit for either a currency
board or inflation targeting. Because of the Balassa-Samuelson effect, a
currency board arrangement may well fail to produce an inflation rate below
the Maastricht ceiling, unless the economy is run with a wasteful amount of
spare capacity.
Pure inflation targeting is consistent both with a highly volatile exchange rate
and with persistent, medium-term misalignments. The credibility of any
inflation target would be undermined by the requirement that the exchange
rate be kept within a specified target zone. In addition, the inflation criterion
of the Maastricht treaty is a ‘raw’ consumer price index, with no allowance
for difference between actual and ‘core’ inflation or between transitory and
permanent changes in the inflation rate.
It seems unlikely that a currency board arrangement will be able to deliver
satisfaction of the inflation criterion for EMU membership without an
unnecessary recession. The sensible alternative, a respecification of the
inflation ceiling in terms of traded goods price inflation (and preferable in
terms of ‘core’ traded goods price inflation), would require a change in the
Treaty.
Inflation targeting can, unless the exchange rate becomes very volatile,
deliver the inflation and exchange rate stability conditions for EMU
membership if the exchange rate criterion is interpreted asymmetrically, and
permits appreciations or revaluations of the exchange rate.
Introducing the euro as a parallel currency in transition countries deserves
serious consideration. Such an act does not prejudge the details of the
monetary and exchange rate regime. It could be viewed as a means of
43signalling a desire for eventual euroisation, through full EMU membership,
without the need for an immediate abandonment of the local currency through
unilateral euroisation.
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46Appendix: Criteria for the Accession to EU and EMU
Criteria for accession into the EU:
In 1993, at the Copenhagen European Council, the Member States took a
decisive step towards enlargement, agreeing that ‘the associated countries in
central and eastern Europe that so desire shall become members of the
European Union.’ The declaration went on to define criteria that need to be
fulfilled by the countries before they can enter, often referred to as the
Copenhagen Criteria.
As stated in Copenhagen, membership requires that the candidate country
has achieved: stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of
law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities; the existence
of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with
competitive pressure and market forces within the Union; the ability to take
on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political,
economic and monetary union.
has created: the conditions for its integration through the adjustment of its
administrative structures, so that European Community legislation
transposed into national legislation is implemented effectively through
appropriate administrative and judicial structures.
Thus the only condition in these criteria that address the question of monetary
regimes is that any entrant into the EU will also make every effort to join the
European Monetary Union in the medium term. None will be able to negotiate
an opt out like Great Britain.
Criteria for accession into EMU
The criteria for the accession into the Monetary Union are much more
specific. They state clear targets for inflation, the nominal interest rate, the




A Member State has to show a price stability performance that is
sustainable and an average rate of inflation, observed over a period
of one year before the examination, that does not exceed by more
than 1 1/2 percentages points that of, at most, the three best
performing Member States in terms of price stability.
Inflation shall be measured by means of the consumer price index




Over a period of one year before the examination, a Member State
has to have an average nominal long-term interest rate that does not
exceed by more than 2 percentage points that of, at most, the three
best performing Member States in terms of price stability.
Interest rates shall be measured on the basis of long-term
government bonds or comparable securities, taking into account
differences in national definitions.
Exchange
Rate
A Member State has to respect the normal fluctuation margins
provided for by the exchange-rate mechanism of the European
Monetary System without severe tensions for at least the last two
years before the examination.
In particular, the Member State shall not have devalued its currency
on its own initiative for the same period.
Government
deficit
The general government deficit may not exceed 3% of GDP, or
should be falling substantially or only be temporarily above though
still close to this level.
Government
debt ratio
Gross general government debt may not exceed 60% of GDP at
market prices, or must at least show a sufficiently diminishing (rate)
and approaching the reference value at a satisfactory (rate).
Thus a fixed exchange rate regime vis-à-vis the euro (including a euro
currency board) would be consistent with the Maastricht criteria, as would a
floating exchange rate regime that does not breach the normal fluctuation
margins, currently 15%.SUERF STUDIES
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